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Abstract 
In December 2006 the Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 on the use of 
nutrition and health claims (NHCs) on foods was enacted in order to 
prevent consumer deception and to harmonise law within the EU. 
Against this background, this paper analyses the potential costs 
and benefits linked with NHCs and the necessity for governmental 
intervention to regulate NHCs within a theoretical and empirical 
framework. 
The theoretical investigation shows that NHCs can induce direct 
economic effects as well as spillover effects in the market of infor-
mation. Whether those effects are beneficial or adverse depends on 
the truthfulness of the NHCs, and consumers’ perception and proc-
essing of such claims. As self regulatory forces of the market might 
not be sufficient to prevent market failure due to fraudulent claims, 
governmental intervention seems necessary. An analysis of the EU 
Regulation on NHCs reveals that this law focuses on preventing the 
authorisation of false or misleading claims. It is less concerned with 
not authorising a true and correctly understood claim.  
The results of the empirical analysis which is based on a standard-
ised consumer survey reveal that the stated impact of NHCs on 
product perception considerably differs among consumers. While 
e.g. some consumers feel misled by NHCs on products with a nega-
tive nutrient profile such as candies, others point out that such 
claims have no impact on their product perception or even help 
them to make better choices. The results also indicate that the great 
majority of consumers is opposed to a ban of NHCs on products 
with a negative nutrient profile such as candies and salt.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Zur Verhinderung der Irreführung von Verbrauchern und zur Har-
monisierung des europäischen Rechts wurde im Dezember 2006 die 
Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1924/2006 zur Regelung nährwert- und ge-
sundheitsbezogener Angaben (NGAs) über Lebensmittel erlassen. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund erfolgt im vorliegenden Beitrag eine Analy-
se der potenziellen Kosten und Nutzen von NGAs. Darüber hinaus 
wird die Notwendigkeit einer staatlichen Regelung zur Verwendung 
von NGAs innerhalb eines theoretischen und empirischen Rahmens 
untersucht. 
Die theoretische Analyse zeigt, dass NGAs sowohl direkte ökonomi-
sche als auch externe Effekte auf dem Informationsmarkt induzieren 
können. Ob diese Wirkungen positiv oder negativ sind, hängt von 
der Richtigkeit der NGAs sowie von ihrer Wahrnehmung und Verar-
beitung durch die Konsumenten ab. Da die Selbstregulierungskräfte 
des Marktes Marktversagen infolge falscher Angaben nicht grund-
sätzlich verhindern können, erscheint die Notwendigkeit eines 
staatlichen Eingriffs gegeben. Die Analyse der EU-Verordnung 
macht deutlich, dass der Fokus auf der Verhinderung einer Zulas-
sung falscher und irreführender Angaben liegt. Negative Folgen 
einer unterlassenen Autorisierung wahrer und richtig verstandener 
Angaben findet in der Gesetzgebung weniger Beachtung.  
Die Ergebnisse einer standardisierten Konsumentenbefragung 
zeigen ein sehr differenziertes Bild im Hinblick auf den Einfluss von 
NGAs auf die Produktwahrnehmung. Während ein Teil der Konsu-
menten das Gefühl hat durch NGAs auf Produkten mit einem negati-
ven Nährwertprofil wie Bonbons irregeführt zu werden, geben ande-
re an, dass entsprechende Angaben keinen Einfluss auf ihre Pro-
duktwahrnehmung haben bzw. ihnen helfen, eine bessere Wahl zu 
treffen. Darüber hinaus weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass die 
große Mehrheit der Konsumenten gegen ein Verbot der Verwendung 
von NGAs auf Lebensmitteln wie Bonbons (16 %) und Speisesalz  
(3 %) ist. 
Schlüsselwörter 
nährwert- und gesundheitsbezogene Angaben; Verbraucherirrefüh-
rung; Informationsökonomik; Markttransparenz; Verbraucherschutz-
politik 
1. Background and objective 
The variety of claims emphasising special food ingredients 
(nutrition claims, NCs) or the impact of food on health 
(health claims, HCs) has increased within labelling as well 
as advertising. As consumers become more interested in 
their diet and its relationship to health this development 
seems to meet consumers demand for information. How-
ever, consumers can only benefit from nutrition and health 
claims (NHCs) if those claims are correct, complete and 
well perceived. To provide a high level of consumer protec-
tion with respect to NHCs and in order to harmonise the 
rules for using such claims at Community level, the Euro-
pean Commission adopted the Regulation (EC) No. 
1924/2006 on NHCs used in the labelling, presentation, and 
advertising of food in December 2006.  
Against this background, the paper analyses the opportuni-
ties and risks of NHCs for the performance of food markets 
and the necessity for governmental intervention to regulate 
NHCs within the framework of information economics 
(section 2). Section 3 deals with the EU Regulation (EC) 
No. 1924/2006 on NHCs, discussing its main elements as 
well as evaluating the possible costs and benefits associated 
with this Regulation. This theoretical perspective is com-
plemented by an empirical analysis (section 4) based on a 
standardised consumer survey. In the final section of the Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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paper (section 5) conclusions and policy implications are 
presented.
1  
2.  Analysis of NHCs from the perspective 
of information economics  
Information economics explores the extent to which mar-
kets and other institutions process and interchange informa-
tion and how information affects economic decisions. Par-
ticular interest is given to situations with information 
asymmetry (MACHO-STADLER and PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, 2001). 
Therefore, this branch of economics provides the adequate 
theoretical background for analysing the effects of informa-
tion given by NHCs to consumers.  
2.1 Effects of NHCs on market transparency 
Market transparency is a fundamental precondition for the 
functioning of a free market economy. Consumers can 
choose products according to their preferences and as a 
result maximise utility. Advertisement can enhance market 
performance by transferring useful information to consum-
ers (IPPOLITO and PAPPALARDO, 2002: 130ff.). 
However, the possible
2 benefits of advertisement can only 
accrue if the following three conditions hold: (1) advertis-
ing is truthful, (2) (some) consumers notice and (3) are 
capable to correctly process, and comprehend the provided 
information.  
With respect to the truthfulness of information on product 
characteristics, theory and empirical research on the eco-
nomics of information, reveal that fraudulent advertising is 
most likely and most harmful in case of credence attributes 
(e.g. RUBIN, 2000: 272). NCs and HCs are credence attrib-
utes: NCs refer to the specific composition of foods
3 and it 
takes a lot of equipment and knowledge to verify the infor-
mation. HCs relate to the impact of food consumption on 
health, but there are manifold interdependent factors that 
influence the status of health and it is hardly possible to 
detect and isolate the effect of a specific food. Due to the 
difficulties in controlling NHCs there is room for fraudulent 
information. The claimed composition of the food may be 
wrong or the positive impact on health may not exist. Both 
kinds of fraud can be classified as objective delusion which 
means that the information does not comply with reality 
(KROEBER-RIEL and WEINBERG, 2003: 286).  
                                                           
1   Though ‘harmonisation of the rules for using NHCs’, is men-
tioned as a central objective of the Regulation (EC) No. 
1924/2006, this objective will not be dealt with in the paper. 
2   We use the term “possible”, since even advertisement that is 
truthful, complete and well perceived may not induce any 
benefits to (some) consumers since they might not at all be in-
fluenced in their action by the advertisement. It is well known 
that consumers’ behaviour with respect to food is influenced 
by a multitude of determinants of which information is one 
(KROEBER-RIEL, WEINBERG, 2003: 120; KROEBER-RIEL, ESCH, 
2004: 74).  
3   Although nutrition claims do not predicate a positive impact 
on health, consumers perceive them like implicit health 
claims. The reason is that consumers know about the impact  
of the nutrient on the body or, at least, they assume a positive 
effect (NATIONAL CONSUMER COUNCIL, 1997: 32; FOOD STAN-
DARDS AGENCY, 2002: 32). 
Perception and processing of claims modifies their influ-
ence on market transparency on an individual basis, and 
thus general statements on the impact of NHCs are no 
longer possible because information processing varies be-
tween consumers. Precondition for a claim to have an effect 
is that it is noticed by consumers. Thus, false information 
only worsens market performance if it causes consumers to 
have false beliefs (e.g. ATTAS, 1999: 50; CARSON et al., 
1985: 50ff.).
4 Hence (some) consumers will not be deceived 
by false claims because they ignore or substantially dis-
count the information as several studies reveal (GARRETSON 
and BURTON, 2000: 214ff.; DARKE and RITCHIE, 2006; 
FRIESTAD and WRIGHT, 1994; FORD et al., 1990). 
In addition, literally true claims might deceive consumers if 
they induce a wrong impression of reality in the minds of 
individual consumers (e.g. BEALES  et al.,  1981: 496ff.; 
ATTAS, 1999: 49; CARSON et al., 1985: 93ff.; KROEBER-RIEL 
and WEINBERG, 2003: 286). Some examples may illustrate 
different ways of so called subjective delusion. 
• A producer claims a product as “90% fat-free”. But 10% 
fat is a high fat content for the majority of products. If 
consumers infer from such a statement that the product 
has a low fat content, this truthful claim is regarded as de-
ceptive (halo-effect, TROMMSDORFF, 2004: 282).
5  
• A claim on salt with added folic acid adverts that folic 
acid lowers the risk of cardiovascular diseases. This kind 
of claim is sometimes regarded as deceptive since it fails 
to disclose that salt increases the risk of high blood pres-
sure (deception by omission, RUBIN, 2000: 280ff.).  
• A claim on jelly beans states that the product is fat-free. 
This claim is true; however, it is true for all products of 
jelly babies (deception by false uniqueness, BEALES et al., 
1981). 
Therefore, the potential of NHCs to improve market trans-
parency and thus market performance is only realised if the 
claim is true and causes true beliefs. Otherwise market 
performance is not influenced, or even worsened. As con-
sumers perceive and process information differently, the 
impact of specific information on market transparency can 
only be analysed on an individual basis.  
2.2 Potential costs and benefits of NHCs 
NHCs can induce beneficial or adverse effects regarding 
two different dimensions: direct economic effects and spill-
over effects on the market for information.  
Direct economic benefits emerge because truthful and cor-
rectly understood claims increase the efficiency of purchase 
decisions, e.g. by providing consumers with information 
that may enable them to improve their diet by eating more 
of the healthier foods and less of the foods most likely to 
cause serious health problems. This is equivalent to an 
increase in consumers’ utility.
6 I n  a d d i t i o n ,  m a r k e t  p e r -
                                                           
4   Unlike lying which is only the attempt in causing someone to 
cause a false belief deception implies success in doing so. 
Thus, deception is an outcome concept while lying is not (e.g. 
ATTAS, 1999: 50; CARSON et al., 1985: 50ff.).  
5   Empirical evidence affirms a halo-effect in case of HCs on 
food as well (ROE et al., 1999). 
6    In addition, diet related costs to society might be reduced, 
inducing positive welfare effects to society as a whole. As Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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formance is enhanced since the opportunity to advertise 
special food ingredients or a positive impact of food on 
health enables firms to tailor their products to the needs of 
consumers (RUBIN, 2004; CALFEE and PAPPALARDO, 1991: 
40; MURIS, 1991: 118; MATHIOS and IPPOLITO, 1999;   
CALFEE, 1997: 26). Direct economic costs arise if consum-
ers believe in false or deceptive NHCs. They may pay 
higher prices for products with such claims, sacrifice taste 
or convenience without gaining a health benefit, eat too 
much of the product they regard as healthy or even leave 
out a necessary medical treatment (CALFEE and PAP-
PARARDO, 1991: 37ff.; CARSON et al., 1985: 99ff.). More-
over, direct economic costs occur if the truthfulness of 
claims can not be verified and if the health value of the 
advertised food product can not be identified by consumers, 
respectively. Referring to AKERLOF (1970) this can lead to 
market failure so that only low quality products (food with 
no or false claims) are sold even though consumers are 
willing to pay higher prices for high quality products (prod-
ucts with truthful claims) (‘Lemon’ problem). 
In addition, substantial beneficial spillovers can be ex-
pected from NHCs for the information market. The most 
obvious benefit is the reduction of consumers’ costs for 
obtaining nutrition and health information. Empirical evi-
dence reveals that disseminating health and nutrition infor-
mation by NHCs can fill a gap in the coverage of consumer 
information: Especially consumers that do not use tradi-
tional sources of nutritional and health advice can be 
reached by NHCs and be encouraged to change their diet 
(MATHIOS and IPPOLITO, 1999: 193ff.; MURIS, 1991: 117; 
CALFEE and PAPPALARDO, 1991: 39; ALDRICH, 1999: 13ff.). 
From that point of view advertising may be a completion 
rather than a substitute to public nutritional information 
programmes (ALDRICH, 1999: 12). Thus, NHCs can result 
in more knowledge about the linkages between food and 
health, thereby increasing the demand for and supply   
of healthier food innovations (RUBIN, 2004; CALFEE and 
PAPPALARDO, 1991: 40; MURIS, 1991: 118; MATHIOS and 
IPPOLITO, 1999; CALFEE, 1997: 26).  
But, NHCs can also induce negative spillover effects on the 
information market. If consumers rely on NHCs they may 
substitute information from private or public experts by 
advertisement that is primarily intended to influence pur-
chase behaviour in favour of the promoted product (CALFEE 
and PAPPALARDO 1991: 38). Even if the claim is true, con-
sumers may come to a decision based on incomplete infor-
mation (deception by omission). 
Other negative effects on the information market accrue if 
the prevalence of false NHCs reduces the credibility of true 
claims (RUBIN,  2000: 278ff.; BEALES  et al.,  1981: 506; 
CALFEE and PAPPALARDO, 1991: 38; CARSON et al., 1985: 
100ff.; DARKE and RITCHIE, 2006) and the overall level of 
trust in NHCs and thus impedes the dissemination of true 
claims (CARSON et al., 1985: 100; DARKE and RITCHIE, 
2006). Empirical studies dealing with the credibility of 
advertising give evidence for the relevance of such negative 
spillover effects (e.g. CALFEE, 1997: 37; CALFEE and PAPPA-
LARDO, 1991: 38, FORD et al., 1990). 
                                                                                                 
those costs are estimated to be considerable and sharply in-
creasing this effect is of great relevance (e.g. LOUREIRO, 2004; 
FINKELSTEIN, FIEBELKORN and WANG, 2003). 
2.3 Self regulatory forces of the market 
The negative effects of deception can be avoided by market 
forces if consumers are able to determine the truthfulness of 
claims by screening the market and/or if firms have the 
opportunity to credibly signal the truthfulness of their 
claims (KAAS, 1991).  
With respect to the former, consumers will seek additional 
information until the cost of continued searching exceeds 
the utility of the information obtained (TIETZEL, 1988: 25). 
In case of NHCs, however, an individual consumer cannot 
screen claims at reasonable costs or access the impact of 
food on health. Thus, consumers can hardly verify the truth-
fulness or falseness of nutritional and health advertisement 
of a specific food even if they consult so called ‘experts’, 
whose credibility varies as well (ALDRICH, 1999: 2; LENSCH, 
forthcoming). As a consequence, the scope to overcome the 
malfunctioning of markets in the case of NHCs by screen-
ing is limited.  
The second group of endogenous market mechanisms to 
reduce the costs of wrong claims are signalling measures. 
Though producers are primarily interested in signalling 
positive and holding back negative information regarding 
their products, economic models of voluntary information 
disclosure indicate that competitive markets will provide 
the required information and prevent deception. According 
to GROSSMANN (1981: 652), all sellers have an incentive to 
disclose the relevant information except the seller with the 
lowest product quality, presupposing that consumers are 
sceptical to products which do not inform about a particular 
product attribute. As a result, the competition with respect 
to providing information (unfolding process) leads to sup-
ply all positive product information. That also applies to the 
negative product information, as long as producers are able 
to promote their product as less negative compared to the 
others.
7 However, the process of unfolding may be impeded 
due to the existence of information overload and bounded 
rationality of consumers. The same holds if firms possess 
market power. In this case, NHCs could even enhance   
that market power leading to an even stronger exploitation 
of consumers at least in the short run (CALFEE and PAPPAR-
LADO, 1991: 37; ALDRICH, 1999: 12; IPPOLITO and PAPPA-
LARDO, 2002: 140 et. seq.; GOLAN et al., 2000: 7ff.).  
As NHCs are credence attributes that cannot be verified by 
consumers, their credibility needs to be supported by com-
plementary signals. Such measures are for example (see 
also LENSCH, forthcoming): 
• Investments in establishing reputation, brand names or 
trademarks which can serve as a kind of guarantee for 
consumers since the firm loses at least part of the value of 
these investments if consumers e.g. eventually discover 
that the quality is not  satisfactory or that claims are false 
(RUBIN, 2000: 279; RUBIN,  2004). Thus, reputation, 
brands and trademarks may help to overcome the problem 
of lemon markets (SCHÖLLING, 2000: 110; THRAMS, forth-
coming).
8  
                                                           
7   IPPOLITO and MATHIOS (1990: 430) exemplified in their 
investigation of the margarine and butter market that all but 
the worst products voluntary provide complete information. 
8   However, it should be noted that an American study could not 
provide evidence that a favourable reputation of a food seller Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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• Certification of NHCs by third parties which assures 
consumers that the information provided by manufactur-
ers is accurate (GOLAN et al., 2000: 9). Although such 
signals can provide valuable information, they are still 
linked to two problems. (1) a certification system will 
only be established if the willingness to pay for a certified 
product is high enough to cover the costs of certification, 
monitoring, and enforcement. (2) since consumers are not 
able to verify the truthfulness of the assumed “independ-
ent” entities, the problem of information uncertainty, 
though reduced, cannot be completely eliminated (HAUCAP 
and SCHMIDT, 2002: 6; GOLAN et al., 2000: 9ff.).  
Despite the existence of endogenous market mechanisms 
dealing with the negative spillover effect on the market for 
information due to false or misleading NHCs, market failure 
may still occur. Therefore, governmental regulation seems 
necessary. 
3.  Economic analysis of the EU Regulation 
(EC) No. 1924/2006 on NHCs made on 
foods 
Existing governmental regulations with respect to NHCs 
differ not only considerably between countries (WHO, 
2004: 11ff.) but also have changed significantly in different 
countries over time (e.g. IPPOLITO and PAPPALARDO, 2002: 
86ff.). In the EU the ruling of NHCs was left to the national 
governments until July 2007 when an EU Regulation on the 
use of NHCs on food was applied. Though the Regulation 
covers textual, pictorial, symbolic and graphic NHCs, the 
provisions predominantly focus on the wording of claims. 
In this section the main elements of this Regulation will be 
presented and analysed with respect to its impact on market 
transparency and economic welfare.  
3.1 Preventing objective consumer delusion 
One central objective of the nutrition and health claims 
Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 of the EU is to reduce 
objective consumer delusion. To achieve this, NHCs are 
only allowed if based on scientific evidence. Consequently, 
non-specific health and well-being-related claims are banned 
if not accompanied by an authorised specific claim. In addi-
tion, claims which suggest that health could be affected by 
not consuming a food product are prohibited. 
The following procedure was implemented to restrict the 
use of HCs in order to prevent objective consumer deception: 
• A community list of permitted health claims
9 – which in 
the literature are referred to as Structure Function Claims 
(e.g. IFT EXPERT GROUP, 2005) – will be adopted. The 
list can be updated according to new scientific results. 
Claims on this list can be used by all food marketers if 
their products meet the standards. 
• A specific authorisation procedure was implemented for 
claims that refer to the reduction of a disease risk and for 
claims regarding childrens’ development and health. The 
                                                                                                 
leads to an increased credibility of HCs perceived by consumers 
(CAUDILL, 1995: 193). 
9   Health claims other than those referring to the reduction of 
disease risk and to children’s development and health. 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is proposed to 
act as the autonomous scientific institution to control the 
validity of these claims and to authorise their use on the 
basis of data provided by the applicants. The claim is de-
signed as a proprietary claim. It cannot be used by other 
producers until the end of a five-year period unless the 
claim is approved based on their own scientific data. 
However, scientists are rarely able to prove a causal link 
between diet and health since “controlled” experiments on 
nutrition are hardly possible, and in addition often open to 
different interpretation. Thus, expert consensus on the health 
effects of food are likely difficult to obtain (CALFEE and 
PAPPALARDO, 1991: 43ff.; IPPOLITO and MATHIOS, 1990: 
432ff.; IFT  EXPERT  GROUP, 2005). Therefore, within   
the implemented authorisation process, two possible errors 
–  Type 1 and Type 2 error  – can emerge (RUBIN,  2004; 
CALFEE and PAPPALARDO, 1991: 41ff.). As figure 1 illus-
trates, a Type 1 error occurs if the use of a false claim is 
approved. Since false claims potentially distort the market 
for products and information authorising them leads to 
societal welfare losses. However, the regulatory body may 
also err by not allowing a truthful claim and make a Type 2 
error. In this case, a possible rise of consumer utility as well 
as the positive spillover effects on the information market 
cannot be realised, thus leading to societal welfare losses, 
too.  
Attempts to reduce the probability of wrong decisions have 
to consider the following interdependencies: 
• Anything that reduces the chance of committing a Type 1 
error will increase the probability of committing a Type 2 
error and vice versa for a given amount of information.  
• The only way to reduce the chance of both types of errors 
is to gather additional information. But additional sub-
stantiation leads to additional research costs and to a 
change in the profitability of products with health impact. 
Therefore the higher the burden of substantiation, the 
higher the risk for producers, the less claims will be made 
and the fewer products will be developed.
10 Taking this 
into account, the request for more scientific proof might 
induce the same kind of welfare losses as the Type 2 error.  
                                                           
10   IPPOLITO and PAPPALARDO (2002) reveal for the US that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between the regulatory 
framework for health claims and their use. In addition, 
PARKER (2003) showed in an empirical study covering the pe-
riod 1998 and 2000 that HCs were almost of no relevance in 
the US. He explains this result with the stringent guidelines 
and the lengthy FDA approval process at that time. 
Figure 1.   Errors in approving NHCs and their 
effects on welfare 
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• Even if firms decide to further invest in proving a claim, 
the level of substantiation affects consumers if useful in-
formation about potential health effects of a product is not 
available. In this case, at least for a limited period of time 
the effects of the Type 2 error occur. As a consequence, 
the decision not to act until more information is available 
is still a decision with effects on product and information 
markets and thus on societal welfare (CALFEE and   
PAPPALARDO, 1991: 42; RUBIN, 2004: 7ff.).  
From an economic perspective, policy making should at-
tempt to maximise expected utility and to minimise ex-
pected total costs of a decision, respectively (RUBIN, 2004: 
8). Given that the costs of Type 1 and Type 2 errors differ 
considerably for different claims the optimal required prob-
ability that a claim is true can vary from close to zero to 
almost one (CALFEE and PAPPALARDO, 1991: 41). Thus, 
from a theoretical perspective flexibility in the level of 
substantiation is required weighting the potential benefits of 
true claims against the potential costs of false claims case 
by case. But in practice measuring costs and benefits in-
cluding those due to the spillover effects on overall trust in 
NHC for each case or even for groups of cases is hardly 
possible.
11 Even labelling the degree of scientific certainty 
for approved health claims as practised in the US since 
2003
12 may be too sophisticated for many consumers   
(MASON et al., 2007; EDCOMS, 2007). 
3.2 Preventing subjective consumer delusion 
The EU Regulation seeks to prevent objective delusion, and 
thus attempts to strengthen market transparency on the first 
level, as well as subjective consumer deception, and hence 
seeks to improve market transparency on the second level, 
with respect to NHCs by several provisions: 
• The use of NCs and HCs in the form of Structure Func-
tion Claims is bound to the declaration of information re-
garding, e.g., a statement indicating the importance of a 
balanced diet and healthy lifestyle on the product labels.
13 
Beyond this, in the case of a reduction of disease risk 
                                                           
11   Furthermore, according to an empirical investigation with 637 
adult consumers which was conducted in Germany in Decem-
ber 2006, the majority of the interviewees (65%) state that 
manufacturers should be free to advertise with reduction of 
disease risk claims (RCs) only if claims are substantiated by 
commonly accepted scientific data. This indicates that a rele-
vant share of consumers benefits from state approval and at-
taches great importance to the prevention of Type 1 errors 
(THRAMS, forthcoming). 
12   In the US since 2003 not only health claims for which signifi-
cant scientific agreement exist are issued by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) but also so called “qualified” 
health claims if accompanied by a disclaimer. Besides claims 
supported by significant scientific evidence three levels of 
evidence are differentiated, each linked to a specific mandated 
disclaimer (IFT EXPERT GROUP, 2005). 
13   In addition, a statement is requested regarding the quantity of 
the food and pattern of consumption required to obtain the 
claimed beneficial effect and “where appropriate a statement 
addressed to persons who should avoid using the food and an 
appropriate warning for products that are likely to present a 
health risk if consumed in excess” (Regulation (EC) No. 
1924/2006). Finally, where NHCs are used nutrition labelling 
is compulsory. 
claim a statement has to be provided “indicating that the 
disease to which the claim is referring has multiple risk 
factors and that altering one of these risk factors may or 
may not have a beneficial effect” (Regulation (EC) No. 
1924/2006). 
• NCs are only allowed if the products meet standards that 
are defined in the Annex of the Regulation. These stan-
dards refer to the presence, absence or reduced content of 
a nutrient in a food, e.g. the NC ‘reduced fat’ may only be 
made where the reduction in content is at least 30% com-
pared to a similar product. 
• Claims referring to weight loss and to recommendations 
of individual doctors or health professionals are prohib-
ited, as well as nutrition claims that compare nutrient con-
tents between different product categories. 
• The use of HCs on alcoholic beverages
14 and of NHCs in 
case of a nutrient profile deemed to be negative for health 
is strictly limited. 
However, the intended aim of these provisions to prevent 
subjective delusion might not be achieved. In addition, the 
first level of market transparency can, as a negative side 
effect, be reduced. This will be illustrated by the following 
examples. 
With additional information buyers shall be enabled to 
assess the claim in an adequate context of e.g. a balanced 
diet and a healthy way of living. This way, the Regulation 
attempts to stop ‘deception by omission’. However, a more 
adequate understanding of the claims only happens if con-
sumers perceive and process the additional information at 
all. Under the constraints of bounded rationality (SIMON, 
1972; KROEBER-RIEL and WEINBERG, 2003: 380ff.; KROE-
BER-RIEL and ESCH, 2004: 190) consumers only use a mi-
nor part of the large amount of available information. This 
especially holds for low involvement purchase decisions in 
case of fast-moving consumer goods (KROEBER-RIEL and 
ESCH, 2004: 148). In fact, experimental studies reveal that 
disclaimers often do not reach their intended objectives and 
can even cause additional problems (see e.g.  EDCOMS, 
2007; WILLIAMS, 2006). Furthermore, the request to pro-
vide additional information and the use of specific wording 
may reduce the effectiveness of a claim as a marketing tool 
and the incentive for producers to use HCs. Thus, requiring 
disclosures can lead to less information and thereby to a 
decrease in market transparency on the first level. In addi-
tion, incentives for a firm to invest in healthy product inno-
vation are reduced. Policy must consider this trade-off   
(IPPOLITO, 2004: 950).  
Limiting the use of NHCs on products with negative nutri-
tional profiles aims at reducing biased perception and 
bringing purchase decision and food consumption more in 
line with scientific dietary recommendations. But NHCs in 
case of foods that have negative attributes do not necessar-
ily mislead consumers partly because consumers assume 
advertising as incomplete and biased in general (CALFEE 
and PAPPARLADO, 1991: 46). Taking the frame of Type 1 
and Type 2 error, the following effects have to be consid-
ered: costs linked to error Type 1 arise if a claim is author-
ised and leaves (some) consumers to hold a false belief 
                                                           
14   NCs referring to low alcohol levels or to the reduction of the 
alcohol content or the energy content will be permitted. Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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about a product. Foregone benefits associated with error 
Type 2 emerge for those consumers that correctly under-
stand the claim and miss out on useful information if the 
claim is banned. Thus, the ban would result in a cutback of 
information valuable for this group of consumers, and 
worsens the first level of market transparency. This leads to 
the core question “How many consumers or what share of 
consumers must hold a false belief about a product and how 
inaccurate must that belief be to consider a claim being 
deceptive”. 
According to the EU Regulation, NCs are permitted if only 
one nutrient exceeds the corresponding limit provided that a 
statement about the specific nutrient (e.g. ‘High sugar con-
tent’) appears in close proximity to the claim. This manda-
tory disclosure might result in a decreased number of NCs, 
because if consumers evaluate those products as less healthy 
(THRAMS, forthcoming; MASON et al., 2007, EDCOMS, 
2007), producers are deterred from labelling their products 
with such claims. Again, the first level of market transpar-
ency would be worsened. However, if it is possible to mod-
ify product characteristics the provision might also motivate 
producers to improve the nutrient profiles of their food 
products to be able to make NCs without labelling the high 
content of the negative nutrient. In this case, the regulation 
would induce positive effects on the product and the infor-
mation market. 
The expositions reveal that the probability and the costs of 
each error are determined by governmental rules of e.g. 
scientific substantiation of claims, information disclosure, 
the wording of claims, and restrictions of using claims. As 
individual differences exist regarding the perception and 
processing of claims, governing health claims often implies 
deciding in favour of one group of the population and 
against another one.  
4.  Perception by the consumers 
As Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 aims at protecting con-
sumers, an empirical analysis of consumers’ perception of 
NHCs as well as their evaluation of governmental policies 
to regulate NHCs was conducted. For this purpose, it is 
essential (1) to look at the relevance of NHCs for buying 
decisions. Thus, it is examined whether they are noticed at 
all and have an influence on market transparency. In addi-
tion, the survey addresses (2) the perception and relevance 
of (non-)governmental control to prevent objective delu-
sion, (3) the relevance of subjective delusion, and (4) ap-
propriate governmental regulation to prevent subjective 
delusion. To investigate these topics, a standardised ques-
tionnaire was developed including questions referring to 
attitudes in general as well as concrete examples for illus-
tration. 
4.1 Description of the sample 
The face-to-face interviews were carried out in December 
2004 by specially trained students of a seminar on NHCs. 
814 adult consumers were recruited at public places in the 
region Bonn/Cologne in Germany. The interviews split up 
into 50% in urban and 50% in rural areas. The distribution 
of selected socio-demographic parameters within the sam-
ple and the German population is shown in table 1. Com-
paring the two distributions reveals that older consumers, 
consumers not qualified for university admission as well as 
consumers in households with under aged children are 
underrepresented in the sample.
15 If results differ signifi-
cantly by the socio-demographic variables, it is pointed-out 
in the discussion.  
4.2 Relevance of NHCs 
In order to appraise the relative relevance of NHCs, re-
spondents accessed the importance of different characteris-
tics, including NCs as well as HCs on a five point scale. As 
shown in figure 2, taste is the most important determinant, 
followed by price. However, food purchases also depend on 
NCs for 32%, and on HCs for 36% of the interviewees.  
To analyse the relevance of health claims more precisely, 
respondents were requested to state whether they consider 
HCs in their purchase decisions. Almost half of the respon-
dents state that they do. Among them, the majority is inter-
ested in HCs only on certain products and not in general. In 
contrast, nearly every second respondent declares not to pay 
any attention to HCs while shopping. Frequently mentioned 
reasons are disinterest (35% of those disregarding HCs) and 
disbelief (15% of those disregarding HCs). The latter indi-
cates that market performance can be enhanced by state 
regulations that reduce the opportunity of fraudulent behav-
iour and thereby increase trust. 
More specifically the relevance of NHCs was analysed in a 
choice set by presenting four existing candy brands.
16 This 
                                                           
15   In comparison with the German population the level of income 
of the sample is lower due to the major group of young con-
sumers (18-34 years). 
16   The choice set consists of the following four products: (1) 
Granini multi-vitamin candies bearing a nutrition claim “with 
vitamins”, (2) fit for Fun candies bearing the two nutrition 
claims “without sugar” and “with mineral nutrients and vita-
Table 1.   Comparison of the characteristics of the 
sample and the German population  
(in %) 
Characteristics  Sample 
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- average size 
- of one person 
- of two persons 
- of three persons 
- of more than four persons 
- without children under the 
























Source: own illustration based on survey results and on data of 
the STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2004)  Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
136 
approach affirms a closer relation to market reality though 
problems may arise in generalising the results. Interviewees 
were asked about their disposition to buy one of the prod-
ucts and in an open ended question about the reasons why 
(figure 3). The results can be summarised as follows: 
• Especially candies with multi-vitamins and cough sweets 
are preferred. 
• Taste is most frequently mentioned for the disposition to 
buy the candy (41%). This holds for each of the four 
brands. 
• 28% of the respondents specify health and vitamins, re-
spectively, as an important reason for their answer.  
Variance analyses shows consistency between reasons to 
buy candies with NHCs and the relevance of NHCs in gen-
eral: people stating that they would buy candies because of 
health aspects including the vitamin content, show a sig-
nificant higher relevance of NHCs in general
17 than people 
stating reasons like taste or brand (p < .001).  
                                                                                                 
mins”, (3) Ragolds cough sweets labelled with a NC “with  
vitamins” and a HC ”promotes immune system enhancement“ 
and (4) Storck candies without any nutrition or health claim. 
17   Index calculated from the three mentioned variables (1) im-
portance of HCs, (2) importance of NCs (see figure 3), and (3) 
consideration of HCs while shopping. 
According to theory confidence in the truthfulness of a 
claim, should increase the relevance of NHCs for 
buying decisions. As consumers cannot confirm or 
falsify NHCs at reasonable costs, confidence in the 
truthfulness of claims was approximated by confi-
dence in HCs made by producers which is in line with 
the trust building process of signalling described in 
section 2.3. Respondents were asked to rank their trust 
in producers’ HCs on a five point scale. The results are 
non-uniform (figure 4): More than 40% of consumers 
distrust producers rather or strongly. In contrast, only 
every fifth respondent trusts them. More than one third 
is unsettled in answering. This is in line with the find-
ing that consumers are in general (more) sceptical 
against (nutrition and health) claims if they are stated 
by the food industry and that consumers do not con-
sider NHCs as an unbiased source of health informa-
tion
18 (FSANZ, 2003: 25; MAZIS and RAYMOND, 
1997; MUELLER, 1991; CALFEE and RINGOLD, 1988). As 
the statement presented to the respondents refers to produc-
ers in general, the result does not imply that individual 
producers cannot reduce or overcome lack of trust by sig-
nalling activities.  
The influence of “confidence in HCs made by produc-
ers” on the relevance of NHCs for buying decisions 
was tested by a model that includes education, gender 
and dietary consciousness
19 as additional independent 
variables. The results of the OLS regression (table 2) 
reveal that confidence in HCs made by producers has 
a significant positive influence on the dependent vari-
able “relevance of NHCs in food purchase deci-
sions”
20. However, the strongest influence stems from 
consumers’ dietary consciousness: the higher the per-
ceived dietary consciousness the higher the relevance 
of NHCs. Gender and education contribute to the 
explanation to a lesser extent, but they still are signifi-
cant on a 1% level. The comparably low R² shows that 
some explanatory variables for the general relevance 
of NHCs are missed.  
4.3 Preventing objective delusion: perception 
and relevance of (non)-governmental control 
To ensure the first level of market transparency NHCs have 
to be truthful. Whether consumers perceive claims as reli-
able depends not only on their trust in producers but also on 
consumers’ perception regarding (non)-governmental poli-
cies to control NHCs. Figure 4 reveals that:  
• Every second consumer supposes the state to check HCs 
and thus already relies on public regulations. Most of 
                                                           
18   Respondents rather believe in the truthfulness of NHCs than 
trust in producers who in fact use these claims. As will be dis-
cussed later, consumers’ expectations of public control (in 
case of NHCs) might give an explanation.  
19   The explanatory variable “dietary consciousness” is repre-
sented by an index of the three selected variables: (1) “How do 
you appraise your nutritional knowledge?” (five point scale), 
(2) “Please judge how health-conscious your diet is” (five 
point scale), and (3) “How many servings of fruit and vegeta-
ble do you eat on a normal day?”. 
20   The dependent variable represents the index mentioned in 
footnote 17. 
Figure 3.   Consumers’ willingness to buy selected  
candies and their stated reasons (in %) 
Which of these candies would you probably buy? Why?








in % brand taste health vitamins other reasons n = 704
Source: own illustration based on survey results 
Figure 2.   Determinants of food choice (mean values) 
12345
Taste







Which of the following facts are important for your food purchase?
Source: own illustration based on survey results Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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them, namely 76%, believe in an inspection before the 
food enters the market.
21  
• Beyond this, there is faith that consumer organisations 
control HCs. More than three quarters of the respondents 
think that consumer organisations do their job in control-
ling producers.  
Thus, the majority of the survey participants believes in 
inspections of the state and consumer organisations. But, if 
consumers believe in a control that does not exist, produc-
ers get room for fraudulent behaviour.
22 
To secure the reliability of claims, the EU Regulation de-
                                                           
21   These results are consistent with NELSON’s remarks (1974: 
749) which indicate that people are in favour to trust in law on 
deceptive advertising, though, in fact law is missing or moder-
ately enforced. 
22   Consumers who trust in health-related claims by producers are 
(significantly) more likely to believe in checks by consumer 
organisations (chi
2 test; p = .002) and less likely to believe in 
state control (chi
2 test; p = .000). 
mands governmental approval of HCs based on scien-
tific evidence. In fact, the majority of consumers would 
appreciate this. For testing this, interviewees were 
asked about their willingness to pay if the positive 
impact on health is proven by the state.
23 Compared to 
a product priced at 1 Euro, almost two thirds of the 
consumers indicated an additional willingness to pay 
of 10 Cents. 43% stated to accept even a higher price 
for increased certainty.
 24 In contrast, every third per-
son is not disposed to pay more. Based on these results, 
the majority of consumers would benefit from state 
approval and control of NHCs.
25 This result is con-
firmed by several other empirical studies (see for an 
overview WILLIAMS, 2005).  
4.4 Relevance of subjective delusion 
The theoretical approach suggests that NHCs can 
change perception (halo-effect) and thus, possibly also 
behaviour of consumers. In case of products with a 
negative nutrient profile like candies, NHCs might lead 
to inappropriate high consumption and thus induce 
adverse health effects.  
To deal with that issue, interviewees were asked for 
their agreement on a five point scale to the 
statement that NHCs are of help in choosing 
a superior alternative in the “unhealthy” 
product category of candies. 46% of respon-
dents agree fully or agree rather to this 
statement. If they are deluded, they are not 
aware of it. They think to benefit from the 
available information and use NHCs for a 
slightly healthier diet.
26 If their self-
assessment is correct, NHCs on candies 
improves market transparency for this group 
of consumers. But about one third of the 
respondents disagree rather or strongly with 
the statement.  
To have a closer look at the perception of the 
sugar content, the interviewees were asked 
for their agreement or disagreement on a five 
point scale to the statement that claims on 
vitamins and mineral nutrients make them forget about a 
high sugar content of candies. Half of the respondents an-
swer that a healthy presentation of candies does not affect 
                                                           
23   The application of a discrete-choice-analysis to survey the 
willingness to pay (WTP) guarantees results with a greater   
external validity in comparison to the direct approach. Corre-
sponding results will be provided within a short time 
(THRAMS, forthcoming). 
24   However, these results cannot predict whether consumers 
would pay an additional charge in reality if the costs of a gov-
ernmental control were transferred on retail prices.  
25  Complementary to these findings, DIALEGO  MARKET  RE-
SEARCH ONLINE (2004) ascertains that for 90% of the inter-
viewees credence would increase if functional food were con-
trolled and explicitly labelled. In this case, 86% of the con-
sumers were more likely to buy functional food.  
26   Subsidiary to these results, WANSINK (2003) shows in his 
analysis that consumers tend to believe that the consumption 
of food products bearing HC help to countervail the eating of 
unhealthy ones. 
Figure 4.   Trust in producers and (non)-governmental 
organisations
1  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
yes undecided no
Do you trust producers when 
they state how their foods 
affect health?
Do you think that the state 
checks claims of producers 
advertising the health value of 
their foods?
Do you think that consumer 
organisations check the 




1 Relating to the first statement interviewees were asked for the degree 
of agreement on a five point scale (from “yes, very much” to “not at 
all”). The top two boxes were classified as “yes”, the bottom two 
boxes as “no” and the medium box as “undecided”. With respect to 
the second and third statement respondents were only given the op-
tions “yes” or “no”. 
Source: own illustration based on survey results 
Table 2.   Multiple regression model for the relevance of NHCs in 
food purchase decisions 






(Constant) 0.755***    3.734 
Confidence in producers’ HCs  0.196***  0.196  6.255 
Dietary consciousness  0.642***  0.422  13.134 
Gender (female)  0.176**  0.082  2.544 
Educational achievement -0.111** -0.089  -2.819 
Number of observations (n)  761     
R² 0.260     
Adjusted R²  0.256     
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001 
Source: own illustration based on survey results Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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their perception. However, every fourth respondent states to 
forget the sugar content if the candy is labelled with such a 
NC. The rest does not really know. The figures have to be 
evaluated in the frame of the standardised questionnaire: 
this approach assumes that consumers are aware of the 
influence of NHCs. Unconscious processes of consumers’ 
perception are not addressed by the question. The share of 
27% of respondents stating to forget the high sugar content 
appears quite high against this background. 
While 59% of the consumers with a high nutrition knowl-
edge (top two boxes)
27 believe that they do not forget the 
sugar content of the candies, this holds only for 37% of the 
respondents with a low nutrition knowledge (bottom two 
boxes, p < .01; correlation: r = 0.139, p < .001, n = 788). 
This provides evidence for the assumption that especially 
for the group with low nutritional knowledge, the high 
sugar content takes a back seat if other healthy ingredients 
are emphasised and give a hint for subjective delusion. 
As abstract questions on this complicated issue might not 
lead to valid answers, pictures of existing candy brands 
were used in addition. The interviewees were asked to ar-
range the three candies
28 with NHCs into a ten point scale. 
The scale was anchored by an apple at point one and by 
candies without health promoting ingredients at point ten. 
On average, participants arranged the three brands with 
NHCs near the medium scale position. However, the share 
of consumers grading the NHC candies with one, two or 
three (and thus close to the apple) was 34% in case of multi-
vitamin candies, about 30% in case of sugar free sweets 
added with magnesium and vitamins, and 25% in case of 
cough sweets. The results give evidence to a shift in percep-
tion due to additional ingredients announced by NHCs.  
4.5  Appropriate governmental regulations to  
reduce subjective delusion 
To prevent adverse health effects due to NHCs on products 
with negative nutrient profiles, the EU-Commission ini-
tially proposed a ban of NHCs on such products. In case of 
candies, only 16% of the interviewed consumers are rather 
or strongly in favour of such a prohibition. With respect to 
salt with NCs about iodine, fluoride, or folic acid, the rejec-
tion of a ban is even higher – only 3% would appreciate it. 
These results show that consumers fear the risk of a de-
creased market transparency (level 1) and the loss of a 
decision-making aid due to an advertisement ban on such 
products. Those findings are in line with an Australian 
qualitative consumer study providing an indication of how 
consumers feel about the concept of disqualifying criteria. 
The majority of the participants does not support and un-
derstand this approach because they are viewing themselves 
in the position of being able to decide whether a food prod-
uct belongs to an all in all healthy choice for them
29 
(FSANZ, 2003: 61). These results challenge governmental 
regulation to ban NHCs on products with a negative nutri-
ent profile.  
                                                           
27   The variable nutritional knowledge is based on a self assess-
ment by the respondents (five point scale). 
28   These are the first three candy brands mentioned in footnote 16. 
29   But, it is worth to mention that the sample includes only con-
sumers who are concerned about the nutritional value and the 
health effects of the foods they buy (FSANZ, 2003: 18). 
In addition, government seeks to prevent subjective decep-
tion by making the use of HCs dependent on mandatory 
disclosures. With additional information buyers shall be 
enabled to assess the claim in an adequate context of e.g. a 
balanced diet and a healthy way of living. However, health 
and nutrition information may be inappropriate not only 
due to missing information but also due to too much infor-
mation, and thus the risk of information overload. In order 
to detect the desired amount of health and nutrition infor-
mation, the interviewees were shown a template with four 
product packages of a yogurt-buttermilk-drink varying in 
the quantity of text related to the NC from no additional 
information up to covering the information requested by the 
guidelines of the EU Regulation (see table 3). The inter-
viewees were asked to choose the alternative which con-
tains the personally relevant information and the one that 
seems most appropriate to cover information needs of con-
sumers in general. The results (table 3) indicate that about 
28% of all consumers would personally favour no addi-
tional information beyond the NC, 20% prefer the NC to-
gether with an additional reduction of disease risk claim. In 
total, almost 50% of consumers assess the claims alone as 
appropriate. About 50% prefer additional information but 
only 15% the quantity requested in the EU Regulation. No 
significant differences exist between consumers responses 
regarding the amount of information they personally prefer 
and those which they in general find to be appropriate (see 
table 3).  
Non parametric correlations (Kendall-Tau-b) show signifi-
cantly that the 
• higher the relevance of NHCs in general (see section 4.2) 
the more information is requested (r = 0.316; p < .001;  
n = 766).  
• lower the level of education the higher the need for   
extended information on the product (r = -0.112; p < .001; 
n = 775).  
Table 3.   Consumers’ assessment of relevant and 
appropriate information on product 
packages 
  Label  
alternatives 
Information on the product package  A  B  C  D 
Nutrition  claim  x x x x 
Reduction of disease risk claim    x  x  x 
Statement indicating the importance of 
a balanced diet and a healthy lifestyle 
   x  x 
The quantity of the food and pattern 
of consumption required to obtain the 
claimed beneficial effect 
   x  x 
Statement addressed to persons who 
should avoid using the food 
   x  x 
Statement indicating that diseases 
have multiple risk factors and that 
altering one of these risk factors may 
or may not have a beneficial effect 
    x 
Which of these pictures provides you 
with personally relevant information? 
(in %) 
28 20 37 15 
Which of these pictures appears as the 
most appropriate? (in %) 
24 22 39 15 
Source: own illustration based on survey results Agrarwirtschaft 57 (2008), Heft 2 
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Nevertheless, as shown above most consumers (85%) do 
not appreciate the information requirements of the EU 
Regulation. Therefore, doubts seem to be justified whether 
the provided amount of information will be perceived by 
consumers. 
Information may also be inappropriate due to lacking com-
prehensibility. Since a general testing of the comprehensi-
bility is not possible, the participants got three realistic 
examples and were asked to evaluate whether the claims are 
easy to understand.
30 The share of people finding the NHCs 
incomprehensible varies between 17% and 54% depending 
on the claim. Particularly, those respondents with a lower 
education had difficulties to understand the claims
31. Since 
incomprehensible claims do not enhance market transpar-
ency, this fact should be considered while formulating 
claims. Claims that will be included in a positive list should 
be tested regarding their comprehensibility within a repre-
sentative sample of European consumers. 
5. Conclusions 
The Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on NHCs used in the labelling, 
presentation and advertising of food aims at preventing the 
dissemination of false or mistakable claims. The Regulation 
is primarily concerned in reducing welfare losses caused by 
the Type 1 error (authorising a false or mistakable claim). 
To a lesser extent it addresses those welfare losses induced 
by the Type 2 error (not authorising a true and correctly 
understood claim). From a theoretical perspective a case by 
case decision based on the probability and the impact of 
both types of errors for each claim would be welfare im-
proving. This kind of analysis needs to consider spillover 
effects on the information market and particularly on gen-
eral trust in NHCs as well as differences among (groups of) 
consumers regarding the perception and processing of 
claims. Therefore, it is hardly feasible from a practical point 
of view. In addition, the regulatory costs of such a proce-
dure would likely over-compensate by far the potential 
benefits.  
The empirical results reveal that NHCs are important for 
consumers in the context of their food purchase decision. 
This relevance, however, differs significantly according to 
the confidence consumers have in claims made by produc-
ers. As trust in producers is low
32 the majority of consumers 
(65%) would appreciate a governmental approval of HCs 
based on scientific evidence, as is requested in the EU Regu-
lation. Thus, the EU approach to prevent objective delusion 
may be appropriate as it can build up and strengthen overall 
trust in NHCs. 
                                                           
30   The comprehension was tested on a five point scale at the 
following examples: (1) “Biological soft drink produced by 
fermentation of naturally raw material” (54% incomprehen-
sion); (2) “This spread contains a lot of vital poly-unsaturated 
fatty acids” (17% incomprehension); (3) “Folic acid plays a 
major role at the cell division and formation” (27% incompre-
hension). 
31   The significant Spearmen-Rho correlation coefficients vary 
between 0.133 ≤ r ≤ 0.175, n = 793. 
32   20.4% of the consumers trust producers, 37.2% neither trust 
nor distrust them, and 42.3% distrust producers. 
Furthermore, the results of the survey reveal the influence 
of NHCs on product perception of candies, a product with a 
negative nutrient profile. Though, 27% of respondents de-
clare that claims on candies make them forget the negative 
nutritional profile, almost half of the respondents (47%) 
state that they use those claims to select the less harmful 
alternative. This underlines that with respect to the effi-
ciency of purchase decisions the impact of limiting the use 
of NHCs on products with negative nutrient profiles differs 
between individual consumers. In addition, the majority of 
consumers (67%) is opposed to a ban of NHCs on candies. 
For salt this share is with 91% even much higher. Thus, the 
results of the survey reveal that the provisions of the EU 
Regulation addressing subjective deception might not reach 
its intended aim and will likely as a side effect reduce valu-
able information for at least some consumers. 
There are two limitations that need to be acknowledged and 
addressed regarding the present study. The first limitation 
concerns the survey method applied: The standardised 
questionnaire allows the identification of problems that are 
consciously perceived and the investigation of governmen-
tal regulations that consumers would accept. However, this 
cognitive approach cannot predict actual behaviour because 
other influences, e.g. emotions are disregarded. So, many 
consumers might be seduced to eat more of e.g. candies 
with NHCs without being aware of it. Thus, there is a need 
for supplementing the results by other research methods 
(e.g. experiments). The second limitation has to do with the 
extent to which the findings can be generalized beyond the 
products studied. Important parts of the survey were linked 
to specific products in order to tailor it to market reality. 
Hence, conclusions are reliable for the setting of the ques-
tionnaire. Further empirical evaluations are needed to ex-
amine the generalisation of the findings. 
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